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Nearly thirty years have passed since the "Columbia Study"
surveyed the financial impact of automobile accidents in America.' The
Study's findings and proposals are familiar: the pattern of compensa-
tion included large areas of economic waste and others of economic
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hardship. The trivially injured often enjoyed settlements several times
as large as their small out-of-pocket losses, while the seriously injured
often received no reparation at all or made settlements for a minor
fraction of their losses. The incidence of under-compensation for
large losses was greatest among families with low incomes. The causes
of hardship lay not only in the financial irresponsibility of many un-
insured motorists, but, the survey said, in the unfairness and anach-
ronisms of the common-law system of liability for negligence and in
the absence of additional insurance benefits to supplement tort law
reparation. The remedy proposed, in 1932, was to jettison common-
law liability and supplant it with legislation patterned after workmen's
compensation.2
The Columbia Study is now dated. The reforms it proposed
have languished. But discussion of the problems it disclosed con-
tinues. Even a cursory survey of recent legal periodical literature
shows wide concern about the justice of existing laws governing
allocation of financial loss from accidents, the congestion produced in
our courts by the administration of these laws, and the hardship which
the total system works on many people. Despite the fact that most
motorists now carry liability insurance and despite the development of
other health and accident benefit programs, the feeling persists that the
pattern of the Columbia Study's findings may still be with us. Yet it
is a feeling largely unsupported by data.8
This article reports the results of investigations in southeastern
Pennsylvania during 1959 and 1960. In a limited way we tried to
update the Columbia Study, and on the basis of the facts found, we
offer a new proposal to deal with the conditions revealed.
I. THE METHOD OF THE STUDY
In the summer of 1959 a team of law students, armed with a
questionnaire and schooled with a statistician's advice, investigated
the results of a sample of accidents reported to the Philadelphia
police. Most of these accidents, we learned, resulted in only trivial
injuries, and so the cases which we wanted most to study were sparsely
represented. To locate more serious cases, we broadened the geo-
graphical base of our survey to include the entire five-county metro-
2See generally Compensation for Automobile Accidents: A Symposium, 32
COLUm. L. REv. 785 (1932).
3 See, e.g., James, The Columbia Study of Compensation for Automobile Acci-
dents: An Unanswered Challenge, 59 CoLUMr. L. REv. 408 (1959). But cf. note 20
infra.
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politan area of southeastern Pennsylvania plus one "non-metropolitan"
county,4 and we drew a new sample of cases from accident reports in
the principal newspapers serving the area.'
The accidents investigated happened in 1956-four years before
the interviews. This four-year aging was deliberate; we wanted to
study only cases in which all claims for reparation, insurance of every
type, and all other benefits paid to compensate for loss resulting from
the accident had been either collected or abandoned. Approximately
500 victims were interviewed. A number of interviews, of course,
yielded information inadequate for tabulation, and even the new method
of selection located many more trivial than severe accidents. Never-
theless, the interviews gave us, we believe, some meaningful informa-
tion about accident cases. They were designed to elicit details about
out-of-pocket medical costs and loss of earnings and to find out to
4We chose Lancaster County, which is outside the Philadelphia metropolitan
area and is both an agricultural and an industrial county. Its total population is
278,359, of which 61,055 live in the city of Lancaster. The results of our Lancaster
survey, when examined separately, seem to follow pretty much the Philadelphia pat-
tern except for the significant fact that many fewer claimants consulted attorneys in
the Lancaster area: in over 75% of the cases, the injured person or someone in his
family handled his own claim. Compare text accompanying note 19 infra. For an-
other variation, see note 12 infra.
5 The newspapers used were the Philadelphia Inquirer and the Philadelphia
Evening Bulletin and the Lancaster Intelligencer-Journal. We believe that these
papers reported most of the serious accidents in the Philadelphia and Lancaster
metropolitan areas. In all, we found reports of 1,646 cases. We then eliminated all
persons who were not residents of either metropolitan area, and this left 1094 cases
to investigate. Of these, 520 could not be located. Of the remaining 574 cases,
approximately 20% either refused to be interviewed or were unable to give sufficient
information to warrant a complete interview. We completed, in all, 464 interviews.
The generalization of the survey results hinges on the characteristics of the cases
which could not be located or did not provide the requisite data. A comparison of
the characteristics of the families interviewed with the general population indicates
that a large proportion of those who could not be located or interviewed were (1)
self-supporting individuals living apart from relatives and (2) families with only
one breadwinner. The great majority of cases interviewed were members of families
that had two or more breadwinners at the time of the accident.
The results of the survey seem to show that the loss of information about un-
attached individuals and persons from one-earner families does not invalidate the
generalizations about the severity of injuries, the expenditures incurred, the sources
and amounts of compensation and related topics. The survey indicates that there
was no connection between the family situation and the physical and financial conse-
quences of the accident. The persons fatally injured or permanently disabled (suf-
fering an impairment of some kind) came from every type of family and the expendi-
tures on account of the injury did not seem to differ with the size of the family or
the number of family members in the labor force.
The lack of information about the "one-person" and one-earner families affected
by accidents could, however, limit the generalizations on the long-run economic im-
pact of injuries on the families affected. A very large proportion of the "one-person"
units are young people in the labor force, who have not yet established families of
their own, and elderly persons living apart from their grown children. The financial
problems connected with injuries in these situations may well be transferred to rela-
tives, the parents of the young people, or the children of the elderly.
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what extent these losses were offset by payments from outside
sources-the "other party" or his liability insurer, the victim's own
insurance, workmen's compensation, or any other kind of benefit pay-
ments received on account of the accident.
II. RESULTS OF THE STUDY
A. Liability Awards
First we analyzed payments from the other party or his liability
insurer. The pattern of these payments, which we shall call "awards"
(to distinguish them from "benefits," the term we shall use for other
forms of reimbursement) is depicted in Figure I. It shows that 46.8
per cent of those injured secured no award whatsoever-that neither
the party perpetrating the injury nor his liability insurer paid any
part of the victim's losses in nearly half of the cases studied. And in
another 5.4 per cent of the cases, the awards were less than half the
victim's "tangible loss," that is, the sum of lost earnings and medical
expenses.6 Thus, we can say that in 52 per cent of the cases studied,
tort law in action yielded less than one-half the tangible accident loss
incurred by the victim. The pattern of awardless victims did not
vary much with the economic seriousness of the accident. Figure I
shows that in no category into which we divided the cases were fewer
than 30 per cent of the victims awardless; generally, the percentage
was between 35 and 45 per cent.
The significance of these percentages is, perhaps, better grasped
in terms of the actual numbers, which are given in Table I. 166 out
of 355 victims received no award (I/4/j).' Ninety of these, however,
suffered tangible losses under $100 (I/4/a), and another 40 of them
had tangible losses under $800 (I/4/b-d).Y
6While data were collected for property losses, such as the expense of auto
repairs, we have eliminated this element from our definition of "tangible loss" be-
cause we want to focus directly on the working of our tort law and insurance systems
with respect to medical expenses and earning losses-on the extent to which these
out-of-pocket costs are reimbursed. The expense of repairing and replacing a car
may be a serious financial problem for some accident victims, but it is a risk which,
as we indicate later, ought to be handled by private arrangements. (Already, we
suspect, most cars on the road are covered by collision insurance.) It is a problem
which differs from the problem of meeting other unreimbursed tangible costs large
enough to cause serious economic dislocation to the family involved.
7 Tables I and II are printed on the fold-out, p. 933. In the reference, (1/4/j),
the "I" designates Table I; the "4" designates column 4 of that table; the letter "j"
designates the horizontal row so labeled.
SLack of insurance explains many, but by no means all, of the cases in which
costs exceeded remuneration. In 46 of our cases (including 2 fatality cases) there
[VoI.110:913
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FIGURE I: AWARDS
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INJURED PERSONS BY TANGIBLE LOSSES
AND THE RATIO OF AwARDs FROM OTHER PARTIES TO TANGIBLE LossEs
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Nearly all the families in our sample had incomes in 1956 of less
than $10,000. Over half had incomes of $5,000 or less. Most of
these families could probably weather the shock of a financial loss of
from several hundred to a thousand dollars resulting from an accident.
But somewhere in that range, the prospect of serious economic dis-
ruption becomes great: a family may be forced to borrow hundreds of
dollars from relatives; savings may be exhausted; property may have
to be sold; a mother or child may be forced to take work to the detri-
ment of homelife. Although the critical loss figure-the threshold at
which accident loss will cause some kind of serious hardship-varies
from one family to another, we would suggest that it is ordinarily no
higher than $800. We believe that most families with unreimbursed
tangible losses in that amount (or more) would suffer sufficient dis-
ruption to warrant community concern.
On the basis of this assumption, unless other kinds of succour
were forthcoming, the families of the 36 victims whose tangible losses
exceeded $800 and who received no reimbursement award (I/4/e-i)
were likely to have experienced serious difficulties. The 11 victims
whose tangible losses were over $1,500 and whose awards failed to
equal half their losses (I/10/f-i) were similarly situated. Thus, our
survey turned up 47 out of 355 random-selected, press-reported acci-
dent victims who suffered losses large enough to cause serious eco-
nomic disruption after taking into account any help in dealing with
their shock loss from the other party to the accident or his insurer.
Contrast the 47 victims who received so little with those who
received so much. About a third of the victims (33 per cent) were
paid awards more than double their medical expenses and lost earn-
ings, and nearly a fifth (18 per cent) received more than five times
the sum of these tangible losses. Only 7.3 per cent received awards
about the size of their tangible losses. In terms of actual numbers, 117
had reparation more than double their tangible losses (I/40/j, 46/j).
Many of these victims clearly appeared to have suffered econom-
ically trivial injuries,9 but it is notable that in the range of accidents
was no liability insurance. Of these 46 cases: in 31 there was no award (I/3/j) ;
in 4 the award was less than 50% of the costs (I/9/j) ; in 4 the award was between
50 and 100% of the costs (I/15/j) ; and in 5 the award exceeded costs (I/33/j,
39/j, 45/j).
9Another way to look at these data is to observe the large number of trivially
injured' persons who received awards greatly exceeding the tangible costs of the
accident. Our study received reports on 157 persons with tangible losses less than
$100 (I/55/a). A third of these-52 persons-received awards in excess of five times
their tangible loss (I/46/a). Indeed, it seems that if one's injuries are slight, he will
receive either nothing or a windfall: whereas 57.3% of those with losses under $100
received nothing, 33.1% received 5 times their loss or better, and 6.4% received
between 2 and 5 times their loss. That leaves only 3.2% who received some award
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with tangible costs ranging from $200 to $3,000, a persistent 20 to
40 per cent of all our cases received liability awards totaling at least
twice the sum of their medical expenses and lost earnings.Y
B. Benefits From Other Sources
Changes since the Columbia Study have meliorated the economic
insecurity of many Americans. We now have more public and
private programs to protect individuals against economic disaster.
Payments from these sources often work to supplement or overlap tort
liability awards to automobile accident victims.
Before evaluating the combined effect of "awards" derived from
the liability system and the various "benefit" programs, we pause to
consider the latter working alone. Nearly half (49.1 per cent) of the
reporting victims-184 out of 375-received no benefits at all from
workmen's compensation, sick leave pay, Blue Cross or other hos-
pital insurance, accident insurance, or any other similar sources
(I/5/j, 57/j). Although the preponderance of this no-benefits group
had tangible losses under $500 (I/5/a-c), and although the likelihood
of some benefits increased significantly when tangible losses exceeded
$800, the amount of benefit payments seldom approached the acci-
dent's tangible cost. Thus, of 59 victims whose losses were over
$1,500, 44 received some benefits, but only 13 received benefits which
amounted to half or more of their losses (I/5/f-i, 11/f-i, 57/f-i). In
only a very few serious cases did the benefits, taken alone, exceed
but one that was less than double the loss. See Figure I. In almost all cases of
windfall awards for trivial losses, the other party was insured. Conversely, 807o of
all cases in which the victim was trivially injured (under $100) and the other party
was uninsured resulted in no award (I/3/a, 53/a). The total cost of adjusting and
settling these trivial cases must be enormous, particularly when one takes into
account their great volume year in and year out.
10 The awards that exceeded tangible costs are not always easy to explain. The
element of pain and suffering seems to be the only explanation for the high settle-
ment value which many claims seem to command. To a far lesser extent, excess pay-
ments may have been made because the claimant, while not an income earner, appeared
to have suffered a physical impairment of indefinite duration. In a few cases the
"excess" shown in the graphs and charts may reflect auto loss or damage.
Among cases in which tangible losses amounted to less than $800 and claimants
received awards of 2 or more times their tangible losses, 78%y of the reporting families
had no unreimbursed auto expense, 25% of the claimants suffered a physical impair-
ment which, while apparently not affecting earning capacity, lasted at least to the
time of the survey, 45% of the claimants were female, 49% were children, 61%
were passengers, and 23% were pedestrians.
A further check of our interview reports of 144 cases in which the award ex-
ceeded tangible costs leads us to believe that in only 7 can the excess probably be
explained by payments for automobile damage. In 10 cases the seriousness of the
injuries was great enough that it is the probable explanation. In 127 neither of these
explanations seems correct and the only explanation for the excess of the award is
pain and suffering.
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tangible losses." The more serious the accident (in financial terms),
the more likely it was that the victim would need an award if he was
to recover his lost earnings and meet his medical expenses."2
C. The Effect of Liability Awards and Benefits Combined
Now we come to the crucial data. Figure H reveals that when
we look at the combined effects of the awards produced by our legal
liability system and the benefits produced by various other economic
security systems, we find 23.9 per cent of the victims still receiving
nothing. Although victims with losses less than $100 predominated
in this totally unaided class-39.5 per cent of victims suffering
tangible loss under $100 received nothing-, a substantial number-
about 10 per cent-persist in the serious cases of loss over $800. This
number is augmented by a much higher percentage of cases in which
tangible loss exceeded $1,500 and the sum of awards and benefits fell
short of one-half of the victims' tangible losses: nearly one-half
of all automobile accident victims with tangible losses over $1,500
had to absorb from their own resources uninsured shock losses of at
least $800,' and in many cases the total shock was much greater.
The boldface entries in Table I cover the same ground in actual
numbers, rather than percentages. They show that 9 of the 84 victims
who received no award and no benefit payments had tangible losses
over $800 (I/6/e-j), and that 21 of the 43 who received awards and
benefits totaling less than one-half of their tangible losses were in the
over-$1,500 loss category (I/12/f-j). So 30 seriously injured victims
out of 352 got grossly inadequate aid from award and benefit com-
bined.Y4  Thus, we find from this sampling that between 8 and 9 per
11 Only 3.7% of the victims received benefits more than double their tangible
losses, and none of these had tangible losses exceeding $1,500 (1/41, 47). Only
2.4% of the victims received benefits more than five times their tangible losses, and
all of these had tangible losses less than $100 (1/47).
i 2 It appears that "benefit" payments may operate more effectively in the non-
metropolitan county represented in our survey, see note 5 supra, than in metropolitan
Philadelphia: approximately 25% of victims in Lancaster County recovered all or
nearly all their costs this way; the comparable figure in the Philadelphia sample area
was about 16%. Generally, however, the Lancaster patterns of remuneration through
awards and benefits in comparison to tangible costs seem to follow closely those noted
in the Philadelphia area.
13The reader who is even slightly concerned with mathematical accuracy will
have by this time become aware of the fact that we have equated "all of more than
$800" with "more than half of more than $1500." This $50 incongruity results from
the fact that our statistical information was classified before we hit upon the figure
of $800 uncompensated loss as representing serious economic disruption; it has been
allowed to remain because we doubt that $750 is a markedly less accurate guess at
the proper cut-off point and because few, if any, of those victims whose loss could
mathematically be less than $800 actually did suffer the smaller losses.
14A few might be added to this 30 from the 14 cases that fall in equivocal classes
of our table (I/12/e, 18/f-g, 24/g-h).
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FIGURE II: AWARDS PLUS BENEFITS
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INJURED PERSONS BY TANGIBLE LOSSES
AND THE RATIO OF THE SUM OF AwARDS AND BENEFITS
TO TANGIBLE LOSSES
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cent of the automobile accident injuries reported in the press result in
economic shock of substantial proportions. And, as has been noted,
most of the families involved were in modest income brackets.
One should bear in mind that we are talking here only of reim-
bursement for medical expenses and earning losses actually incurred.
Yet in a number of our cases the injury caused an ongoing disability-
probable future losses which will probably not be reimbursed. And
in a number of cases the victim's automobile was destroyed or dam-
aged, and this loss, too, may have been thrust upon the family, though
we deliberately chose not to reckon with it in our figures. Thus, 10
per cent is probably a conservative estimate of the number of cases in
our sample in which an accident on the highways imposed a sub-
stantial ($800 or more) burden on a family." When families in-
volved in this situation cannot meet resulting expenses from their ac-
cumulated and uncommitted savings, they must appeal for help to
relatives, friends, charity, or relief authorities-all unhappy alterna-
tives, to say the least.
That is one end of the spectrum. At the other end are the cases
where award and benefit payments ran high in comparison to tangible
losses suffered. Thus, in 131 out of 352 reported cases, the victim re-
covered over twice the amount of his loss (I/42/j, 48/j). In over
half of these cases the victim's loss was relatively trivial-less than
$200 (I/42/a-b, 48/a-b). But among cases in which the tangible
losses were between $200 and $3,000, there was a substantial num-
ber-about 10 per cent-in which the victim received more than five
times the sum of his medical expenses and earning losses (I/48/c-f,
59/c-f), and an even more substantial bloc of victims--over 25 per
cent-received between two and five times their loss (I/42/c-f, 59/c-f).
1. Fatality Cases
Our study also included 73 fully reported cases of victims who
were killed.' In 10 cases, survivors received neither awards nor
benefits (II/3/j) ; in none of these cases was the loss under $500, and
in 8 the loss was over $800 (II/3/e). In 8 cases awards and benefits
together totaled less than half the loss (II/6/j), and in 5 of these the
loss was over $1,500 and, therefore, awards plus benefits still left the
family in the shock-loss zone (II/6/f-h). Thus in at least 13 of 73
death cases-17.8 per cent-the sum of awards and benefits left the
survivors with unreimbursed losses in excess of $800 at the time of
15 When we combine all cases it is clearly 10%. See p. 923 infra.
16 See Table I.
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burial, and this is without reference to the ongoing losses suffered
in cases where the deceased was a breadwinner.1
7
2. The Fatality and Nonfatality Cases Combined
Altogether, our limited survey disclosed 151 cases occasioning
tangible losses exceeding $800-some of them, of course, involving
thousands of dollars of loss (I/60/e-i, II/30/e-h). In 17 of these
cases the economic shock was wholly unrelieved (I/6/e-i; II/3/e-h);
in another 26 the relief was insufficient to cover tangible losses ex-
ceeding $800 (I/12/f-i; II/6/f-h). Thus, in 28 per cent of cases in-
volving $800 or more loss and 10 per cent of the entire group of 425
fully reported cases studied, there were unrelieved losses of sufficient
magnitude to create a significant likelihood of immediate, serious eco-
nomic dislocation to the accident victim and his family.
D. Some Further Observations
1. Delay
Another source of hardship and disruption is delay in the pay-
ment of awards. A seriously injured victim whose final award turned
out to be adequate may nevertheless have gone financially unaided for
months or even years, struggling with a discouraging burden. In a
majority of cases in which there was any award, that is, any settlement
or verdict at all, it took more than a year to reach the result. In a
substantial number, particularly in the lowest income group, it took
more than three years to conclude the case.' Our interview reports
17 1n 45 out of the 73 fatality cases, the decedent was head of a family. In 7 of
these 45, no award or benefits were paid. In 15 the decedent was in the lowest income
group, that is, he was employed, if at all, as a laborer or service employee. In 6 of
these low-income, family-head death cases, survivors were left with expenses which
exceeded their awards and benefits. Life insurance seems to have been a critical
factor; without it, 14 family-head death cases would have left survivors with awards
and benefits insufficient to pay debts resulting from the accident as well as no sub-
stitute resources for the victim's wages.
18 The following table shows the percentage distribution of families of persons
whose injuries incapacitated them for at least one full day, including the fatally in-
jured, by the time elapsed between the accident and the settlement or verdict.
Length of Time
Between Accident Economic Group of Injured Persons
and Settlement Low Middle High
under 6 months 29% 36% 34%
6 months to 1 year 17% 16% 5%
1 to 3 years 28% 36% 44%
3 years or more 26% 12% 17%
Total 100% 100% 100%
In the "3 years or more!' category, there were 4 cases reported as still pending, all
in the low economic group.
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suggest that the delays of this sort, which now seem so entrenched in
our personal injury system, often may have exacted a heavy toll in
terms of frustration and financial difficulty.
2. The Need for Legal Services
The survey reflects the need for lawyers if adequate awards are
to be secured by accident victims. Indeed, retention of a lawyer
greatly increases the prospect not only of an award but of an award
in excess of tangible loss. In all but 6 of the 117 fully reported non-
fatality cases in which the victim or his family retained an attorney,
the victim had some sort of award (I/l/j, 49/j); in 78 the award
was at least twice the out-of-pocket costs of the accident (I/37/j,
43/j).19
Those who retained no lawyer hardly fared as well. We have
data on 194 nonfatality cases where no lawyer was retained (I/51/j).
The "other party" was insured in each of these cases. Yet in 129 of
them the victim received no award (I/2/j). Even among the 52
cases in which the tangible loss was over $500, there was no award
in 34 cases (I/2/d-i, 51/d-i).
III. EVALUATION OF THE DATA
At the beginning of this article we reported having undertaken
our statistical study because of suspicions that existing tort law and
the benefit systems that supplement it do not allocate the economic
burdens of automobile accidents satisfactorily. Of course, a judgment
that the present system does not work well is only intelligible when
measured with reference to the goals that are desired. We see the
need for a system that will, at a minimum, (1) provide security
against the serious economic dislocation that results from some auto-
mobile accidents, (2) and do so with reasonable dispatch, (3) and
impose the lowest practicable administrative cost, as well as (4) put
the smallest practicable financial burden of insurance costs on the
motoring public, and (5) command a maximum of public confidence
in the fairness and efficiency of the system.
The results of our survey indicate that the present system does
not adequately protect many who, by dint of accident, come to need
help desperately. The results also indicate that tort law in action-
the business of securing awards-is fraught with delay and uncer-
tainty; its generosities are largely reserved for the trivially injured,
19 And note that any portion of an award that went to pay for legal services was
not calculated as part of the award.
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and there it seems prodigal, nor, in all probability, does the law in ac-
tion conform with the law in theory. Our results also seem to coin-
cide with findings made by others who (like us) have taken modest
samples of the financial impact of accidents on the highways20 Of
course there is room for much more research in this area. But we
seem to have in hand some important evidence indicating disturbing
defects in our system for disbursing accident losses.
Many proposals have been made for change. All of them reflect
the conviction that deficiencies of the kind we are talking about are
not likely to be cured by judicial development or redevelopment of
tort and damage law-that at least some significant needed changes
can come only through legislation.2" Thus far legislatures have been
persuaded only to alleviate hardships resulting from the financial ir-
responsibility of motorists' But even assuming financially responsi-
ble drivers, our survey indicates that tort law supplemented by exist-
ing benefit programs does not provide a system that adequately meets
the goals posited above. The "unsatisfied judgment fund" is the
newest experiment.' In our view, these programs, too, may be both
inadequate and costly. They do not cut to the heart of the problem:
the need of some families forced into serious financial distress by the
inadequacies of our present system of automobile accident awards
and benefits. Furthermore, they may impose high charges on the
motoring public to furnish benefits in trivial cases where the claimants,
at worst, are already protected by other schemes and, at best, are
fairly well able to take care of their own losses which are nevertheless
shifted to a blameless public.
The more radical reforms thus far suggested-those which would
abandon fault as the basis of legal liability-have not marshalled
broad-based political support, and there is no great indication that they
will. The fault principle may still be deeply rooted, closely tied to
popular concepts of justice in our society; the public may well believe
20 ADAMS, A SURVEY OF THE ECONOMIc-FINANCrAL CONSEQUENCES OF PERSONAL
INJURIES RESULTING FROM AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS IN THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA,
1953 at 42-56 (1955) ; Franklin, Chanin & Mark, Accidents, Money, and The Law: A
Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4, 32,
33-35 (1961); James & Law, Compensation for Auto Accident Victims: A Story
of Too Little and Too Late, 26 CoNN. B.J. 70, 78 (1952). Professor Albert F.
Conard of the Law School of the University of Michigan is presently engaged in a
survey which, we understand, will include, among other things, findings on the finan-
cial impact of auto accident cases.
21 See, e.g., EHRENZWEIG, "FULL Am" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM
(1954); GREEN, TRAFFIC VIcTimS-ToRT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958). Compare
Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARv. L. REv. 463 (1962).2 2 The various statutory methods are succinctly described in Plummer, The
Uncompensated Automobile Accident Victim, 1956 INS. L.J. 459.
23 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-61 to -91 (1961), as amended, §§ 39.6-64
to -70 (Supp. 1961); Plummer, supra note 22, at 462-63.
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that negligence ought to be the criterion of legal liability for accidents.
But it is difficult to condone, in today's world, the economic hardship
and waste which our survey seems to disclose. The most likely im-
provement may be one which least disturbs the status quo and yet still
advances the goals set forth above-particularly the goal of providing
some security for all motorists and pedestrians against economic loss
of disastrous proportions.
IV. A PROPOSAL: SUPPLEMENTARY COMPENSATION
IN ECONOmiC DISASTER CASES
We present here the bare outlines of legislation designed to meet
the inadequacies disclosed by this study. Its objective is to give
limited help to those who have been seriously injured, irrespective of
their fault, by a system of supplementary insurance-but only when
their reimbursement from established sources has fallen disastrously
short of the "tangible loss" inflicted by the accident. A corollary ob-
jective is to eliminate the dissipation of insurance resources that may
result from paying proportionately large sums to those who have
suffered little in the way of tangible losses. If savings can be effected
that way, it may be possible to establish and maintain the supple-
mentary insurance fund through minimal charges on owning or op-
erating motor vehicles; ' and it may be that this can be done without
adding to the heavy burden which that activity already bears in the
form of high rates for liability insurance.
A. Eligibility
To conserve resources for helping automobile victims, to reduce
the administrating burden, and to limit the scope and impact of sub-
stantive changes (and thus ameliorate difficulties normally attendant
upon basic change in basic law), we would make the relief of supple-
mentary insurance available only in economic "disaster" cases. Recog-
nizing the complexity of defining a disaster case, we suggest, tenta-
tively, that supplementary insurance benefits be limited to those whose
unreimbursed medical expenses and earning losses total more than,
say, $800. As already indicated, we are by no means certain that $800
should be the figure. But we start with the premise that a line must
2 4 The fund could be a state fund, collected by taxing drivers or motor vehicles
or the gasoline they use. It could be a privately amassed fund, collected by automobile
liability insurers as an incident of all policies sold-a fund to which all who buy
liability insurance would contribute if they wanted liability insurance at all. (And,
of course, other laws would provide the incentive for "wanting" it.) Under the latter
arrangement, automobile liability insurers would be required to hold themselves-as
a group---under obligation to automobile accident victims.
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be drawn to distinguish cases of serious proportions 5 It is probably
wise to draw that line relatively high at first. We suspect that, in
most cases, tangible losses of less than $800 can somehow be met from
savings or credit without so disrupting the victim's family that its mis-
fortune should become a fiscal concern of the state or the motoring
public as a whole. Families that cannot weather a certain amount of
loss may be so close to the subsistence level that any other costly mis-
fortune could easily put them on relief. Their economic security can
hardly be guaranteed effectively by trying to protect them against
auto accident losses while ignoring other common risks. Further-
more, if the figure is fixed very far below $800, the cost of the program
might rise out of proportion to the need for supplementary aid. In
any event, we only suggest $800 as a reasonable figure for purposes
of illustration.
We would exclude the costs of auto repair or replacement in cal-
culating a family's qualification for supplementary relief. Of course,
cars are an economic necessity to many families; but the risk of this
loss can be, and probably is in most cases, handled through private
insurance. The cost of collision insurance may be high, and its ad-
ministration may beget problems; but we do not believe these costs
and problems should be imposed on an insurance fund created by law
to meet the pressing needs of families facing severe economic hard-
ship. To do so would add immensely to both the administrative over-
head of the fund and the reserves needed to pay claims against it, and
would saddle the motoring public with expenses disproportionate to
our social needs.
B. Extent of Relief
Like other excess insurance, the fund's relief should leave some
burdens with the victim, as a brake on medical extravagance and
malingering and as an incentive to private insurance and private prose-
cution of liability claims. The fund should pay only, say, 85 per cent
of the medical expenses that it covers. Perhaps standards of reason-
able medical expense could be developed as a further limitation.
Earning-loss relief should be calculated on, say, a $600 per month
take-home maximum, with the thought that income greater than that
is not needed to ward off the kind of economic disaster we are trying
to avoid. The rate of reimbursement of earning losses should be
25 Of course, it might be possible to construct a formula to vary the point at
which supplementary insurance would become available, depending, for example, on
the net income and other resources of the victim's family. But such a formula might
produce dangerously difficult problems of administration. The better choice, we think,
is to set a fixed figure.
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further limited to a rate of 85 per cent of average earnings in the year
preceding the injury, with proper exceptions for cases in which such
a formula would be unwise. Disability relief for earning losses should
end at normal retirement age when social security and other retirement
benefits accrue. Perhaps some protection of private retirement bene-
fits up to modest limits should be attempted.
Death of the victim should not relieve the fund from paying to
his dependents (if he has any) whatever benefits it would have had to
pay to him up to the time of his death. Perhaps the fund should in-
sure funeral expenses up to some modest amount, subject, of course, to
the same $800 deductible provision. The fund might also provide ad-
ditional death benefits where fatality victims were principal bread-
winners. 6 For a period of, say, four years, the family would be
guaranteed resources equal to some fraction of the decedent's earning
rate at the time of the accident-again, with a ceiling of $600 a month.
If reparation from the other party or his liability insurer, insurance
benefits, social security, employment death benefits, and the value of
the decedent's estate (not counting, perhaps, moderate investment in
a family home) did not produce that amount, the fund would do so.
C. Financing the Fund
The fund, as we have noted, would be financed by some sort of
charge, slight we hope, on the motoring public. In addition, of course,
it would enjoy full subrogation rights. But we believe additional steps
must be taken to offset the financial burden that establishing and re-
plenishing the fund would impose on drivers or car owners.
Our study indicates that automobile accident victims who incur
small tangible losses often get awards and benefits equal to more than
twice the tangible losses that the accident inflicted. If some of this
money could be diverted, it could be used to aid those in serious straits.
Small claims usually have a nuisance value, for although settle-
ment of them costs insurance companies a great deal, litigation, ap-
parently, would cost even more. This nuisance value is augmented
by the insurance practice of maintaining reserves for unsettled claims.
These reserves may tie up funds that would otherwise be available for
other purposes. Insurance companies are often eager to liquidate
claims and free the "salvage" in these reserves. Most important in
2 6 Although these benefits would be restricted to cases in which the decedent was
the principal breadwinner, some provision for short-term benefits might be made in
the case of a decedent who provided over a quarter of the support of a family whose
total income is less than $400 per month. Similarly, a small fixed sum might be
appropriate when the death of a mother who cared for small children will necessitate
child-care expenditures for a few years. Of course, these benefits, too, should be
available only if other resources were significantly inadequate.
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endowing these claims with nuisance value, however, is the fact that
they are unliquidated; since claimants are entitled by law to damages
for pain and suffering and since a jury verdict may far exceed a small
claimant's tangible losses, he can usually demand and get much more
in litigation than the special damages he can prove.
The law of liability for pain and suffering does not depend on the
magnitude of the plaintiff's medical expenses and loss of earnings.
And our survey shows, we think, that this law frequently produces
prodigal settlements in trivial cases, whereas it seldom does so for
those who are seriously injured, with, of course, spectacular exceptions.
In some cases this is probably because the available insurance coverage
is exhausted by payment of tangible losses. But probably more im-
portant is the fact that large claims do not have the nuisance value that
small claims do; determined opposition to large claims is more feasible
and more economical. The nuisance value of small claims is in-
creased by the fact that quick settlement plus release protects the in-
surance company from slowly developing injuries not yet recognized
at the time of the settlement. Sometimes small claims turn into
larger ones; it may often pay to be forehanded and get them settled,
thus avoiding some of the responsibilities that might otherwise develop.
The value beyond tangible losses that small claims now have may
well be a major burden on motor vehicle operation. Other studies27
indicate that this "over-compensation" may in fact be a widespread
phenomenon and may be regarded by a large element of the public as
something of a "gravy-train" for those who are tempted to pad their
claims. Resources now dedicated to giving relatively large awards
to the trivially injured could be more wisely used if they were diverted
to where the need is a crying one. This can be accomplished only by
changing the law of torts governing small claims for personal injuries
arising out of automobile accidents. We would propose that in all
cases involving tangible losses under $800: (1) the right to pain,
suffering and mental anguish damages be abolished; (2) claimants'
benefits be allowed to inure to the benefit of the other party to the
accident; and, as a necessary corollary of those changes, (3) small
claimants be given the right to recover their reasonable legal expenses.
1. Pain and Suffering
Liability for pain and suffering appears to inflate many small
claims; when, however, a victim's total out-of-pocket medical expense
27See HUNTING & NEUWIETH, WHO SUES iN NEW YORK CITY: A STUDY OF
AUTOMOBIm ACCIDENT CLAIMS 153-80 (1962) (resumis of "case histories" eliciting
attitudes of claimants). But see ADAMS, op. cit. smpra note 20, at 57-60.
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and earning loss-past and prospective-can be liquidated at less than
$800, compensation for pain very often seems to place an unwise
burden on motor vehicle operation. Of course, some pain and suffer-
ing has economic consequences; it may reduce earnings and earning
capacity or require medical expenditures. Such losses should be
treated as tangible losses for purposes of determining whether the
"costs" of the accident (as we use that term here) exceed $800.8 But
insofar as the total tangible losses caused by the accident, including
actual costs inflicted by pain, are less than $800-insofar as the eco-
nomic consequences are slight-we should try to conserve resources
needed for the relief of accident victims who face economic disaster.
2. Collateral Benefits
For the same reason it would seem wise to withhold double pay-
ments to reimburse the same costs in relatively trivial cases. Thus
liability awards would be reduced to the extent that benefits have been
received. Giving the other party to the accident the advantage of de-
ducting the injured person's medical, health, and accident insurance
will often keep the victim from setting in motion complicated collection
machinery used to get payments for costs which have already been
dispersed.2 9
3. Recovery of Legal Expenses
Eliminating recoveries for pain and suffering and abolishing the
collateral benefits rule would reduce the settlement value of these small
claims cases and make them less attractive to lawyers. Our plan seeks
to offset this consequence, for the study shows that claimants who are
28 The facts of Carminati v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 405 Pa. 500, 176 A.2d
440 (1962), provide an interesting analogy for explaining this distinction. A ten-
year-old girl was run down by a streetcar and knocked unconscious. Apparently
there were no permanent physical injuries except for an impairment of her ability
to coordinate her eyes. Her medical expenses totaled only $199, and it seems that
no evidence beyond the injury itself was offered to show impairment of her earning
capacity. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court sustained a verdict of $79,500. The
opinion does not say how much of this award was for pain and suffering and how
much was for impairment of the child's earning capacity and other economic prospects
-the court discussed loss of prospects of marriage in an economic vein. Under our
formula, even though the medical expenses were "trivial," this case would probably
be governed by existing damage law, since we surmise that the plaintiff could have
shown a probable tangible economic loss, such as the impairment of her earning
capacity and possible loss of the support of a husband, that could be valued at over
$800. It is only when elements of damage like this add up to less than $800 that we
would exclude damages for pain and suffering.
29 We would be less persuaded by this argument in more serious cases, in which
benefits are more likely to be de ininimis, often much less than the attorney's fees
that the victim will have to pay to get an adequate award. If the benefit involved
is workmen's compensation, the benefit payer is usually subrogated to the tort claim,
and there is no overlap of benefit and award, so far as the victim is concerned.
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not represented by lawyers tend to fare poorly.30 Accordingly, in
cases in which the pain and suffering award is abolished, and the claim
is settled (or a judgment entered) in the claimant's favor, we would
require the defendant to pay the claimant's attorney according to a
schedule that would allow a basic fee of half as much as the claimant's
recovery (the equivalent of a one-third contingent fee) .3' This re-
quirement might stimulate more generous treatment of unrepresented
small claimants, and we do not believe that it would swallow up the
saving resulting from the diminution of small claims by means of elim-
inating pain and suffering damages and giving the defendant the ad-
vantage of the claimant's health and accident insurance. Over a third
of the victims we studied whose tangible losses were under $800 re-
ceived awards more than double their tangible losses, with a sub-
stantial number of those whose tangible losses were between $100 and
$800 getting over five times their tangible losses (after deducting law-
yers' fees). If these recoveries were reduced to tangible losses, the
defendant allowed to set off claimant's benefits, and counsel fees held,
for the most part, to at least half the amount collected, substantial
savings should be effected.
This change in tort law provides more satisfactory settlement
practice between those with small claims who are unrepresented by
lawyers and liability insurers' claims agents. Since damages are
easily liquidated and since the insurance company can avoid liability
for claimants' attorneys' fees by settling promptly, settlements are likely
to be effected more often, more cheaply, and more quickly, with more
fairness to the motoring public.
D. Compensation for the Cost of Recovering From the Fund
Those seriously injured and entitled to relief from the new fund
will often need legal representation to collect their claims. Their prob-
lems will be like workmen's compensation claimants!, though some-
times more complicated. Not only will they have to show that their
injuries (or their decedent's death) "arose out of and in the course of"
an automobile accident-if that is the proper formula-but they will
30 Table I shows that while 102 out of 153 victims with tangible losses of $800 or
less who did not retain lawyers received no payment from the other party to the accident
or his liability insurer (I/2/a-d, 51/a-d), only 2 out of 79 who did have lawyers
fared so badly (I/1/a-d, 49/a-d). Of course, many of those who did not retain lawyers
might not have had claims in which a lawyer would have been much help, and of
the 102 who had no lawyer and who got no award, 74 had tangible losses under $100
(I/2/a).
31 For all small claim cases a minimum fee should be allowed-we suggest $25.
And in cases in which substantial litigational services have been needed for collection
or in which defendants have procrastinated unreasonably in settlement, the allowable
fee should be increased.
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have to establish other elements of entitlement. This is lawyers' work.
The cost of needed legal services engaged in consequence of an auto-
mobile accident flows as surely from the accident as the cost of medical
services; it should be calculated as a tangible financial loss resulting
from the accident for which the fund will compensate. Legal fees,
like medical bills, should be compensable at, say, an 85 per cent rate
and subject to standards of reasonableness. In determining a reason-
able legal fee, it should be borne in mind that collecting from the fund
will usually be much less difficult than collecting a liability claim. The
claimant's attorney need not be concerned with negligence, con-
tributory negligence, or pain and suffering. If disability payments
are periodic, he need be little concerned with prognosis. Although he
may occasionally have difficult questions as to his claimant's eligibility
or the extent of the claim, the routine case will rarely merit a fee of
more than 15 to 20 per cent of the sum collected. On the other hand,
if fee allowances are ungenerous, the quality of representation gen-
erally available to claimants will be too low. Fees should be attractive
enough to enlist well-qualified champions for claimants.
E. Adjusting the Plan to Future Needs
There will be no organized political forces working to keep the
fund and its benefits at appropriate levels as inflation or deflation skew
them out of line. At the outset, legislation should fix the more or less
arbitrary boundary between trivial and substantial claims, maximum
disability payments, and so forth. But these arbitrary figures are not
likely to remain satisfactory. The legislature can probably preserve
both the scheme and its own time if it provides for periodic adminis-
trative recalculation of the original figures according to variations in
an index such as the Bureau of Labor Standards' cost-of-living index.
Eventually, of course, changed conditions are bound to outmode
the very foundations of the plan we have proposed. In our estimation,
it is politic for our own times. But if and when social security be-
comes more adequate or the pattern of transportation, automobile
accidents or insurance programs change, the plan may become funda-
mentally defective. The law, like the technology of transportation,
must keep on changing with the times.'
32 We have not discussed here the desirability of a comparative negligence rule.
While comparative negligence might alleviate some of the hardships and, possibly,
some of the economic waste which concerns us, we believe the changes advocated
here would still be necessary.
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NOTES
TANGIBLE LOSSES include medical expenses and loss of earnings but
do not include legal expenses. In cases of fatality (Table II), Tangible
Losses also include funeral expenses, and lost earnings are limited to the
period between the time of the accident and the time of death, so that the
fact that earning capacity is destroyed by death is not reflected in the table.
COMPENSATION includes awards and benefits; it does not include
reimbursement for legal expenses.
AWARDS include payments to injured persons from either the other
party to the accident or the other party's liability insurer, whether resulting
from litigation or settlement.
BENEFITS include all forms of reimbursement other than awards, such
as workmen's compensation, sick-leave pay, accident insurance, etc. In
cases of fatality (Table II) they also include life insurance benefits.
COMPENSATION RATIO is the ratio of compensation, awards, or bene-
fits (as the case may be) to tangible losses. (For example, a victim whose
tangible loss was $1,000 and who received $1,200 from the other party by
way of settlement and $400 from Blue Cross would be listed as having a
compensation ratio, considering awards only, of 1.2 (I/28/e) ; a compensa-
tion ratio, considering benefits only, of 0.4 (I/11/e) ; and a compensation
ratio, considering both awards and benefits, of 1.6 (I/36/e).
INS. & LAw.-These columns include persons injured in accidents in
which the other party was insured and the injured person retained a
lawyer.
INS. & No LAw.-These columns include persons injured in accidents
in which the other party was insured and the injured person did not retain
a lawyer.
No INs.-These columns include persons injured in accidents in
which the other party was uninsured. (They include two cases of persons
fatally injured in accidents involving uninsured drivers.)
TOTAL CASES.-The totals for each category are indicated by two fig-
ures. The figure on the left, without parentheses, is the total number of
cases in the category as to which relevant information was actually reported.
Only such cases are broken down for inclusion elsewhere on the table.
The figure on the right, in parentheses, is the total number of cases in the
category that were contained in the sample.
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